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Abstract 
The exploration and extraction of oil in the territorial sea of Equatorial Guinea and 
Chad’s southern region of Doba have led to certain socio-economic and political 
dynamics among their populations. The literature developed around the concept of 
'resource curse' is helpful in understanding how oil stimulates the governments’ rentier 
behaviour and authoritarianism, as well as the countries’ poverty and inequality. 
However, not all the similarities between the cases are explained by these approaches 
and some of the differences are relevant to understand the specific configuration of the 
curse in these countries. Only by taking into account historical trajectories, the 
particular strategies of local as well as non-local actors, and the international political 
economy in which oil is extracted and commercialised, can we properly analyse all 
these dynamics in their complexity. 
 




In the last decade, the traditional flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa 
linked to natural resources has dramatically increased, leading to what some scholars 
have named a "new scramble for Africa" (Carmody, 2011; Southall and Melber, 2009). 
                                               
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the AEGIS Congress ‘Questions around the extraction 
of natural resources in Africa’, 14 and 15 April 2011, Madrid. 
European Journal of Development Research (2013) 25, 584–599. 
 2 
The broad context of this phenomenon includes the increase of the price of certain 
commodities, particularly oil; the rising demand for these commodities from emerging 
economies like China or India; the deployment of new geopolitical strategies of 
energetic supply by the US; improvements in the extraction technology which render 
profitable deposits that were not; and last but not least, the changes towards 
liberalisation in the regulatory frameworks of FDI that have occurred in most African 
countries. 
The socio-political and economic effects of extractive industries in developing 
countries have been increasingly analysed. In this regard, there are numerous 
aggregated cross-country studies, as well as single-country case studies.2 This article 
intends to participate in these debates, comparing the particular experiences of two 
Central African newcomers in the global oil market.  
Oil extraction is a recent industry in Chad and Equatorial Guinea, oriented to 
external markets and led mainly by US companies. It has created extractive enclaves in 
distinct geographies. Chad, with 11.5 million inhabitants, is a landlocked country, 
mainly Sahelian but with a well-endowed subtropical south. Chadian oil must cross 
Cameroon through a pipeline that ends at Kribi in the Gulf of Guinea. There, oil is 
shipped off the coast, in front of Bioko. This island is part of Equatorial Guinea, a much 
smaller tropical state with around 720,000 inhabitants, with a large exclusive economic 
zone in the surrounding sea, where oil reserves are being exploited offshore (see Figure 
1). Equatorial Guinean crude is loaded directly into oil tankers that sail mainly to the 
US, along the same routes as those from Kribi. Since they both pour crude into the Gulf 
                                               
2 Since Sachs and Warner (1995), a prolific literature has developed this line of research (Wick and Bulte, 
2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008), including sophisticated econometric approaches in many cases, 
such as World Bank (2002) and Ross (2001 and 2009). A case for regional and comparative studies is 
made in Basedau (2005). Some regional studies are available such as Gary and Karl (2003) and Soares de 
Oliveira (2007). A specific comparative study on the effects of oil in Chad and Sudan is made in 
Behrends (2008). 
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of Guinea they can be considered part of the same geo-economic region. Furthermore, 
they are also members of the Economic Community of Central African States 
(CEMAC), and share currency, the Central African CFA Franc. 
Both cases have been analysed using the insights of the resource curse framework.3 
This perspective, as we will see in the next section, highlights the connection between 
the extraction and exportation of mineral resources with enduring authoritarian political 
orders, bad developmental outcomes and economic stagnation. Our comparison is 
initially encouraged by the existence of explanations based on the resource curse 
approach in two countries where the authors had conducted fieldwork. We want to 
analyse to what extent the similarities that exist in both cases are explained by the 
resource curse theories, or are better understood taking into account alternative 
variables. At the same time, we will also investigate if dissimilarities put into question 
key assumptions of the resource curse theories. Our comparison has exploratory 
purposes, and its conclusions must be taken as consolidated hypotheses rather than hard 
findings.  
A kind of non-developmental despotism has characterized political regimes in both 
places. In Equatorial Guinea, Obiang Nguema rose to power in 1979 overthrowing his 
uncle, Macías Nguema in a palace coup, whereas Idriss Déby conquered the presidency 
of Chad through a coup d’état in 1990. Since the end of the Cold War they have 
legitimated their positions in the international arena by celebrating presidential elections 
(in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011 in the case of Déby; and in 1996, 2002 and 2009 in the 
case of Obiang), but they actually remain in power thanks to the manipulation of the 
electoral processes and the extensive use of repression. 
                                               
3 See for example McSherry (2006), Gould and Winters (2011), Gary and Karl (2003) and Yates (2012). 
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In spite of their large revenues inflows they remain included in the UN's Least 
Developed Countries category. Furthermore, Chad is ranked 183 out of 187 in the 2011 
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2011). Even though Equatorial Guinea ranks 136 
in the same classification, it is the country with the largest difference between its rank in 
GNI per capita and its rank in the Human Development Index (91 positions).4 Poverty is 
widespread in both countries, estimated in 2006 by the World Bank (2012) at 77 per 
cent of the population living below the national poverty line in Equatorial Guinea, and 
55 per cent in Chad in 2003. 
The pattern of development of the oil exploitation projects are similar in the 
chronology and the origin of the transnational companies involved, which are mainly 
US ones. In Chad, oil has been extracted since 2003 by a consortium of transnational 
companies (TNCs) led by ExxonMobil, in a project that constitutes the single biggest 
private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Oil production in Chad was approximately 
115,500 barrels per day (bpd) in 2011, having peaked in 2005 with 173,000 (see Table 
1). In the case of Equatorial Guinea, different joint ventures led by Marathon, Hess and 
ExxonMobil have been in charge of oil extraction since 1996. In 2011, its production 
was 252,000 bpd, and it peaked in 2005 with 358,000 bdp. It remains the fifth largest 
African oil producer, only behind Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and the Republic of Congo 
(BP, 2012). 
In the following section we will use some of the resource curse insights to 
understand the internal dynamics prompted by oil extraction in both countries. Our aim 
is to investigate to what extent the consequences of oil production in Chad and 
Equatorial Guinea can be explained using this framework, and to identify what is 
needed in addition to explain the specific outcomes. In the third and central section of 
                                               
4This surprising feature can be explained because the GNI per capita is very high (17,608 international $ 
in PPP) due to a huge inflow oil rent coupled with a small population. 
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the article we will show how a perspective that takes into account the particular 
historical trajectories, the role of non-local actors, and the international political 
economy of oil, explains better the specific socio-economic and political outcomes that 
oil extraction produced in Chad and Equatorial Guinea, as well as some of the features 
they share. 
 
What resource curse approaches illuminate in Chad and Equatorial Guinea 
The Dutch disease approach 
The so-called ‘Dutch disease’ approach argues that the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate due to massive entries of foreign currency hurts the tradable non-mineral sectors, 
because their relative prices worsen vis-à-vis the rest of the world, thus becoming less 
competitive (The Economist, 1977; Corden and Neary, 1982).  
In Chad, the production of cotton and livestock oriented to export were in decline 
and progressively being substituted by food crops when oil exploitation started in 2003. 
Thus, Chad's stagnant competitiveness in non-oil sectors is better explained by changing 
cotton international prices and persisting productive constraints, such as low level of 
infrastructure development (Nachega and Wieczorek, 2012: 36). Extraction does have 
other socio-economic consequences: the instalment of a shanty town in the village of 
Komé, next to the main operational facilities of the oil consortium, has attracted people 
in search of employment related to the local oil industry, prompting prostitution and the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. Employment creation in the area has been limited and temporary 
in many cases, agriculture yields have deteriorated because of pollution, and other 
serious environmental impacts are harming the health of the local populations (Reyna, 
2007, p. 82-85).  
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The main cash crop in Equatorial Guinea, cocoa, was already declining when oil was 
discovered, but agriculture activities oriented to subsistence or local markets have also 
suffered a setback in recent years, and food is mainly imported from neighbouring 
countries such as Cameroon. The appreciation of the currency is not the sole cause of 
these uneven effects, as the Dutch disease approach would suggest. The regional 
character of the CFA Franc and its link to the euro guarantees a certain degree of 
monetary stability regardless of domestic circumstances. The aforementioned effects on 
the food sector or the general rise in the cost of living experienced in the country must 
be related to other social and economic dynamics such as the large migration flows to 
the towns from rural areas and neighbouring countries prompted by oil industry.  
In our cases, some of the socio-economic outcomes related with oil exploitation are 
not explained by the Dutch disease theory. That takes us to the second theoretical strand 
of the resource curse framework, derived from political economy approaches.  
 
The rentier-state approach 
Starting with the work of Mahdavy (1970), this approach maintains that the low growth 
rate observed in countries with an abundance of natural resources is due to the existence 
of an external rent. This rent feeds corruption, waste of money, large and expensive 
projects with little productive sense (white elephants), and rent-seeking behaviour. 
Furthermore, if such a rent gives a sufficient fiscal base to the government, it has no 
need to tax the population, thus weakening the social contract between citizens and 
state. In this situation, public finance controls loosen and the government does not have 
an explicit obligation to meet social demands with public spending. Thus, the personal 
enrichment of the élite, as well as its preservation in power, would prevail over other 
European Journal of Development Research (2013) 25, 584–599. 
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political goals (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Yates, 1996; Karl, 1997 and 2005; Ross, 
1990 and 2001; Auty 1993 and 2008; McFerson, 2009). 
These dynamics are visible in our two cases. In Equatorial Guinea, individuals in 
government accumulate most of the rents paid by companies through different 
mechanisms such as the direct payments of oil rents to private bank accounts, or the 
constitution of local companies in order to sign joint ventures with oil TNCs (Frynas, 
2004, US Senate, 2004; Wood, 2004; McSherry, 2006; Shaxson, 2007). Oil has also 
empowered the government with new instruments of social control such as those 
developed through labour relations. In Equatorial Guinea, employment agencies owned 
by the President’s relatives, ensure that no political dissident gets a job in the oil sector 
(Campos and Micó, 2006). The clientelistic distribution of oil rents appears to be a 
conscious policy of the government in order to prevent the emergence of a middle class, 
and a stronger opposition movement. In fact, the political opposition suffers the politics 
of repression, cooptation and fragmentation that oil rents enable, while investment in 
health, education and sanitation remains scarce.5 
In Chad, the oil rent that flows to the country since 2003 has significantly 
empowered Déby and his clientelistic entourage. Since the beginning of the oil project’s 
construction phase in 2000, an important proportion of the contracts associated with it 
and lateral programs financed by the WB, have favoured the president’s entourage 
through companies focused on delivering services to the construction and oil 
companies. As in Equatorial Guinea, the rent has also served to consolidate their power 
                                               
5 Among the main political parties of the opposition we find the social-democrat Convergencia Para la 
Democracia Social (CPDS), the more liberal-right wing Unión Popular (UP) and Alianza Popular de 
Guinea Ecuatorial (APGE), and the Frente Democrático Republicano (FDR), whose social bases are 
found in the same area as the Nguema family (Mongomo). Now in exile, there are also the Partido del 
Progreso (PP); and the Movimiento de Autodeterminación de la Isla de Bioko (MAIB), which defends a 
secessionist project for the island. 
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through reinforced authoritarianism (Magrin, 2003; Gould and Winters, 2011; Gary and 
Reisch, 2004; Massey and May, 2005 and 2009; Petry and Bambé, 2005). 
 
Oil and internal conflict 
In the Chadian case the oil rent has fuelled armed conflict as well. In 2005 an armed 
rebellion born in the innermost circle of the President, established itself in the Eastern 
part of the country and launched successive attacks on the capital N’Djamena in April 
2006 and February 2008. Apparently, the rebels’ uprising was a reaction against the 
modification of the constitution carried out by Déby in 2006, in order to be eligible for 
re-election that same year. That was perceived as a move to block the possibilities of 
competing for succession and to have direct access to the oil rent (Gould and Winters, 
2011; Massey and May, 2006 and 2009; Pegg, 2009). In Equatorial Guinea, the Nguema 
family seems to maintain tighter control of the political and economic mechanisms of 
the country. However, the government suffers periodical menaces from abroad: 
different armed groups, from South Africa or the Niger Delta have attacked the country 
in 2004, 2007 and 2009 (Ghazvinian, 2007; Shaxson, 2007; Güell, 2009).  
These violent dynamics have also been analysed using the rent-seeking argument, 
correlating resource abundance and armed conflict. According to Paul Collier and other 
scholars, mineral resource extraction raises the probability of generation and persistence 
of violent conflicts, because of the predatory and ‘greedy’ behaviour of politicians and 
militia fighters, who see the conflict as an opportunity to gain access to resources that 
otherwise would be out of their reach (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998 and 2004; Ross, 
2004).  
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The resource curse approach illuminates some of the logics underlying the domestic 
political and economic dynamics in both Chad and Equatorial Guinea. However, the 
shortcoming of this approach is that it does not analyse in detail the effects of oil 
extraction in each country. Furthermore, although these theories convincingly explain 
the rentier behaviour of governments, they do not clarify why these governments, and 
the particular individuals behind them, benefit most from oil wealth. The resource curse 
approach does not help to understand the obvious continuities displayed in the way 
power and control is exercised, before and after oil discoveries in both countries. 
Finally, if greed is one explicit reason to fuel insurgence or armed attacks, as the 
economic approach to war points out, the longer history of grievances and conflicts in 
these cases receives scant attention. 
Some scholars have pointed out some of these shortcomings. Di John (2007) 
highlights that the corruption and authoritarianism present in many oil-exporting 
countries are better explained by previous political dynamics. Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2008) make a distinction between ‘resource abundance’, and ‘resource dependence’. 
Whereas the resource curse approaches take ‘resource abundance’ as the share of 
mineral exports to total exports, or the share of mineral-related production to total 
production, these are, rather, proxies for ‘resource dependence’. This is a more 
meaningful concept for the political economy of development, related to a particular 
economic structure produced by history and power relations. In Wick and Bulte (2009) 
the case is made for paying attention to institutional quality as a conditional factor of the 
curse and some scholars even suggest, like Haber and Menaldo (2011), that in the long 
run resource abundance might be a blessing in terms of developmental outcomes. 
Regarding the violence that natural resources may produce through rebellions led 
exclusively by greed, Cramer (2002) argues that in the real world wars cannot be 
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explained by rent-seeking reasons: there are grievances, ideologies and collective 
actions difficult to explain with the neo-classical approach that underpins the 
mainstream theories. 
Our contribution emphasises the need to widen the focus to include dimensions and 
actors poorly taken into account by the resource curse approaches, in order to 
understand the specific relation of oil extraction with poor developmental outcomes, 
authoritarianism, corruption and violence in Chad and Equatorial Guinea. 
 
Oil extraction in context: widening the focus of the resource curse 
Three dimensions, closely related to each other, are necessary to better understand the 
construction of the particular curse suffered by most of the population living in 
Equatorial Guinea and Chad. These dynamics refer to the particular historical 
trajectories of both territories, the role of some non-local actors (particularly TNCs), and 
the international political economy of oil extraction. 
 
Common and particular historical trajectories 
As in the rest of the continent, the end of colonial rule brought in both cases the 
international recognition of sovereignty and the emergence of new independent states. 
The principle of sovereignty conferred on the new governments the legal representation 
of the state and the capacity to negotiate internationally, regardless of their legitimacy 
and representativeness among the local population. According to Bayart (2000), the 
acquired sovereignty did not change the extraverted nature of colonial power in the 
continent, and dependence on external resources became the main basis of the ruler’s 
control over the population. 
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Since then, new governments have obtained resources from their role as 
‘gatekeepers’ between the population and international markets and donors (Cooper, 
2002). Continuity with colonial economy was more obvious in Chad, as cotton persisted 
as the main export. In independent Equatorial Guinea, cocoa production, along with 
coffee and timber, dramatically declined after the expulsion of Spanish owners and 
Nigerian workers by Macías Nguema's government (Fegley, 1989; Sundiata, 1990). Aid 
from the former metropolis (Spain for Equatorial Guinea and France for Chad) and 
other donors helped to maintain weak administrations and autocratic leaders in power. 
In Equatorial Guinea, aid flows during the 1980s, especially from Spain, increased as 
the government realigned with the Western side of the Cold War. At the same time, 
export of timber became a new source of income for the state. Whereas in Chad, French 
influence has been very strong from the beginning, particularly evident in the significant 
military presence in the country. 
In both countries power has been exercised in a very authoritarian manner by the 
governments, which are occupied nowadays by two army officials: Obiang Nguema and 
Idriss Déby. As we have mentioned, they took office after toppling their predecessors in 
1979 and 1990 respectively, long before oil extraction commenced. The end of the Cold 
War brought constitutional changes in most of Africa, as well as new discourses on 
behalf of the donors in favour of democracy and human rights. However, though 
periodic elections are celebrated since the 1990s, they are systematically flawed and 
manipulated. Personal ties count more than institutions and formal regulations in the 
relations between authorities and population; and human rights violations are one of the 
main tools of political control. 
Obiang Nguema’s internal constituencies are mostly his own family from the Eastern 
region of the continental territory (Mongomo district), which has controlled the state 
European Journal of Development Research (2013) 25, 584–599. 
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since independence (Fegley, 1989; Linigier-Goumaz, 1996). His relatives occupy the 
highest ranks of the Army and most of the public administration. Territorial officials 
belong to the incumbent party (Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial, PDGE). In 
spite of occasional violent attacks from abroad, with minor participation of individuals 
inside the country, the government maintains a strong command over the population, 
which allows it to boast internationally about the stability in the country (Nzang, 2009; 
Sant, 2008).  
In Chad, key positions in the network of power, including the Army, also belong to 
the closer circle of Déby, many of them from the Zaghawa clan, from the East. Déby’s 
control over the whole territory is, however, looser than Obiang’s.6 Nowadays it is 
possible to find either Muslims or Christians everywhere in the country, but the ethnic 
and geographic cleavage between the traditionally Muslim North and East and the 
mostly Christian and animist South, has shaped Chadian political history. During the 
1980s and 1990s, after oil discoveries, violence was widespread in the Doba basin 
between Habré's and Déby's government, and Southern militias (Reyna, 2011, p. 147-
151). 
Rebellions erupted again in Chad in 2005, and seriously challenged central 
government until 2008, when thanks to oil wealth and international support mainly from 
France, Déby has been able to build a powerful army capable to quell uprisings.7 This 
                                               
6 Some scholars have considered that during the 1980s Chad was a virtual failed state (Buijtenhuijs, 1998; 
Azevedo, 1998). 
7 In February 2008, at the time of the most serious attack on N’Djamena, three groups comprised this 
alliance: the Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UFDD), lead by Mahamat 
Nouri, an ancient Déby minister; the Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement, led by Timan 
Erdimi; and the UFDD-Fondamentale, constituted by a group of former members of the UFDD, led by 
Abdelwahid Aboud Mackaye, as well a former collaborator of Deby. From that moment on, rebellion 
faded because of the co-optation politics of Déby, and the cited huge increase of military power of the 
Chadian army financed by the oil rent. At the end of 2008 a new alliance was set up, the Union des 
Forces pour la Résistance (UFR), with material support from the Sudanese government. However, the 
peace agreement between Sudan and Chad in January 2010 has undermined the UFR, and currently they 
have no real probability of defeating Déby militarily (Hansen, 2011; HSBA, 2011). 
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time, rebellions came from the East and were born in the close circles of Déby, 
including members of the Zaghawa clan. Even though access to the oil rent might have 
been a reason to start rebellion in 2005, it cannot be fully explained without reference to 
specific grievances like those suffered by the Tama people of northeastern Chad 
(Behrends, 2008, p. 49; Reyna, 2007, p. 85-87). There have also been strong 
international connections with the Sudanese conflict in Darfur (de Waal, 2008). 
Moreover, uprisings within the group in power seems to be a common device in the 
pursuit of power in Chad: Déby himself held key positions in the Army with Hissène 
Habré before organising a rebellion in 1989 that managed to oust Habré from 
government in 1990. 
The current supremacy of Déby and Obiang and their authoritarian exercise of power 
can be explained as products of oil rents, since these rents allow them to acquire the 
necessary means to settle their authoritarian system, to corrupt or co-opt the opposition 
and to face rebellions with success. Nevertheless, there is a history that began long 
before oil discoveries. This history includes shared experiences such as the European 
colonial domination, which configured both territories in terms of dependency to the far 
away metropolis. The postcolonial political elite did not manage to structurally 
transform the extraverted nature of the colonial administration, and the state was built 
on a patrimonial rationale, rather than a bureaucratic or developmentalist one. This also 
explains why, when oil was discovered, these countries lacked both the technical 
capacity and the social setting to be able to take advantage of the oil industry. 
Oil discoveries and extraction amplified, rather than maintained or drastically 
transformed, certain old authoritarian and impoverishing phenomena. At the same time, 
oil exploitation halted some more recent trends, such as the political reforms initiated in 
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the early nineties. The arrival of oil TNCs and other investments related to oil reduced 
the effectiveness of the wave of political reforms in these countries. 
 
Non-local actors in the oil era 
The resource curse theory makes visible populations ‘cursed’ by the extraction of 
minerals, and identifies the local elites and governments as the main beneficiaries and 
proponents of the rentier dynamic. Nevertheless, if minerals constitute an external 
source of rents it is because they become valuable and are commercialised somewhere 
far away. The process of transforming underground oil into government rents is, 
therefore, a transnational one in which oil TNCs play a central role. This is especially 
true in many African countries, such as Equatorial Guinea and Chad, where technical 
and financial capacities were non-existent at the time of oil discovery, and the 
development of the oil industry was made by TNCs, mainly from the US in these cases. 
In 1992, Walter International Inc., owned by the former US ambassador in Equatorial 
Guinea, Chester Norris, made the first offshore discoveries near Malabo.8 Other US 
companies followed, led by Marathon, Exxon-Mobil and Hess Corporation, which 
signed sharing contracts with the government. Today, these agreements include joint 
ventures with parastatal GEPetrol and other private companies from all around the 
world including the Energy Africa (UK), Sasol (South Africa), Petronas (Malaysia), 
Roc Oil (Australia), CNOOC and CNPC (China), and Repsol (Spain).  
In 1988 a Convention Agreement was signed between Chad’s government and a 
Consortium of three companies (Chevron, ExxonMobil and Shell). This Convention 
granted a 30-year concession of exploration and exploitation around the area of Doba. 
                                               
8 Authors who pay particular attention to oil companies in Equatorial Guinea and Chad are Ghazvinian 
(2007) and Harel (2006). 
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ExxonMobil through its subsidiary EssoChad assumed the operational leadership. The 
Consortium was restructured two times, and when operations commenced in 2000, the 
participants in the Consortium were Exxon Mobil (40% stake), Petronas (35%), and 
Chevron (25%). At the same time, two public companies were constituted to manage 
the pipeline: TOTCO (Tchad Oil Transport Company) and COTCO (Cameroon Oil 
Transportation Company) (Pegg, 2005).9 
Soon after extraction began in both countries, oil revenues paid by the 
aforementioned TNCs became the main component of the respective countries’ budgets. 
They reached 63.3 per cent of the total revenue in Chad in 2010, and 92.4 per cent in 
2009 in Equatorial Guinea (see Table 1). Nevertheless, TNCs are not only the actual 
providers of rents: they also participate in the private appropriation made by the 
individuals in government, and in the social fabric of the resource curse in different 
ways, such as by paying minimal compensation for ancient trees that were chopped 
down to construct the oil fields in Doba (Petry and Bambé, 2005). 
In Equatorial Guinea, relations between companies and government account for 
many legal and illegal, public and secret, exchanges such as the payment of Obiang 
Nguema’s lobby in Washington, the concession of scholarships to Nguema’s children in 
the US, the renting of buildings and plots owned by the Nguema family, or the contract 
of workers through labour agencies controlled by Obiang relatives (US Senate, 2004; 
Campos and Micó, 2006). Furthermore, oil companies directly facilitate the diversion of 
public funds and the personal enrichment of officials. In 2004, a US Senate report 
denounced the payments made by US oil companies to numerous bank accounts in the 
Riggs Bank, based in Washington, controlled by Obiang Nguema and some few close 
relatives (US Senate, 2004; Global Witness, 2004). Foreign companies in sectors other 
                                               
9 For a broader background of the oil project in Chad, see Gary and Reisch (2004), International Crisis 
Group (2009) and Colom (2010 and 2012). 
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than oil, such as construction, have signed joint ventures with individuals holding 
positions in the government or close to them. These partnerships provide the domestic 
political elites with exclusive ways of accumulating wealth and power. 
Foreign governments have also reinforced relations with Malabo. Condolezza Rice 
received the Equatorial Guinea president in 2006 in Washington as a ‘good friend of 
America’ (The Washington Post, 2006). High officials from China or Brazil, among 
others, are keen to develop economic and diplomatic relations with Malabo. President 
Obiang has significantly expanded his presence and leverage in regional and 
international fora, thanks to foreign interests related to oil.10 
In Chad, the role of oil companies has evolved following strategic French and US 
interests in the country. At independence, in 1960, the French government made sure 
that an agreement was reached to ensure that mineral resources in the country would not 
be developed without their consent and the involvement of Elf (the French oil 
parastatal). In 1969 the then-president Tombalbaye got rid of Elf and turned to the US 
firm CONOCO, which successfully found oil in 1971. Many think that the coup d’état 
that overthrew Tombalbaye in 1975 was at least partially related to this fact (Reyna, 
2011, p. 143). 
In 1982 Hissène Habré reached power thanks to the financial and logistic support 
from France, but more crucially from the US.11 So, not surprisingly the Convention 
Agreement of 1988 involved two US companies. France reacted by supporting Déby 
and his coup d’etat against Habré, in what some have labelled as a 'coup d'État militaro-
                                               
10 However, transnational NGOs, media and even judicial and legislatives bodies such as those in US, 
France or Spain have tried to scrutinise the agreements between government and oil companies and the 
destination of oil rents (US Senate, 2004; Silverstein, 2012; Amnesty International, 2009; Global 
Witness, 2004 and 2009; EG Justice, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
11 The deplorable human rights record of that time is in part the responsibility of the Direction de la 
Documentation et de la Securité (DDS), a unit which had US support (Reyna, 2011, p. 144; Amnesty 
International, 2001). 
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pétrolier Elf' (Reyna, 2011, p. 145). As a consequence, two years later Déby forced the 
entry of Elf into the Consortium to the detriment of Chevron. Although Elf left the 
Consortium in 1999, the project’s construction phase started the following year and 
benefited many French firms. In October 2003 oil extraction commenced several 
months ahead of schedule and the first exports to the US were recorded.12 French and 
US interference has continued ever since: when the last major rebel attack took place in 
February 2008, and Déby was about to be toppled, only an external French intervention 
prevented this from happening (Bayart, 2008, CCFD, 2012) 
In the case of Chad, other transnational actors are crucial to understanding the 
political economy of oil. Beyond its modest financial contribution, it was the WB who 
established the legal grounds that guaranteed the flow of benefits to the investing 
companies without fear of expropriation. Nevertheless, the most visible feature of the 
WB involvement in Chad was the establishment of a policy framework intended to 
avoid the resource curse through good governance (Humphreys et al., 2007, Arezki et 
al., 2011). At the request of the WB, the national parliament passed in 1999 the Loi 
001/PR/99. This law established that out of the total direct revenues (royalties and 
dividends), 10 per cent had to be allocated to the Fonds pour les Générations Futures, 
and 90 per cent to the national treasury, mostly for social expenditure.13 At the same 
time the government had to undertake the process of formulating a Poverty Reduction 
                                               
12 The reasons behind Elf’s decision remain unclear. The official explanation offered by Elf stated that the 
profitability of the project was dubious. Other sources say that since Elf at that time was under 
investigation for corrupt practices in France, the company intended to avoid further scandal by not getting 
involved in a project with such a complex setting. This last reason explains why Shell also left the project 
(Reyna, 2011, p. 145). 
13 80 per cent of this had to be allocated to the sectors considered poverty reducing, the so-called priority 
sectors (health, social affairs, education, infrastructures, rural development, environment and water 
resources), 15 per cent to the functioning of the government and 5 per cent to the oil region (Logone 
Oriental). 
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Strategy Paper (PRSP). Finally, in June 2000 the WB board approved the project and 
begun its execution.14 
Despite the strong ‘good governance’ component of the WB involvement in the 
Chadian project, it has not prevented the government’s rentier behaviour. The Fonds 
was cancelled at the end of 2005, and the money was allegedly used to expand military 
spending in a context of armed rebellion and increasing insecurity (Gould and Winters, 
2011). The WB position, between the interests of the TNCs and the government, was 
hard to maintain and in fact it had to abandon the project in September 2008 (Reyna, 
2007; Pegg, 2005 and 2009; Winters and Gould, 2011).  
In sum, the configuration of the curse is always a matter of two or more parts. In an 
oil economy, rentier behaviour on the part of governments cannot be properly explained 
without the profit logic of the private companies. On the other hand, some of the 
divergences we perceive between our two cases are in part product of the differences in 
the transnational actors involved and their particular relationship with local ones. The 
political economy of oil in Chad and Equatorial Guinea is therefore shaped by the 
interests and strategies of many actors, which work in contexts that go beyond national 
territories. It is to these broad contexts that we turn our attention now.  
 
The rules of the international political economy 
None of the local or transnational actors that we have mentioned act according to their 
interests in a structural and institutional vacuum. Certain features and dynamics of the 
                                               
14 The Loi also established a body to control spending, the Collège de Contrôle et Surveillance des 
Ressources Pétrolières. This body’s purpose was the management of the revenues allocated to the priority 
sectors. Members of the Collège were appointed by the government, as well as by civil society through 
previously designed NGOs (Gould and Winters, 2007; Kojucharov, 2007). To complete the institutional 
setting, the first PRSP was finally approved in 2004 within the framework of the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative promoted by the WB and IMF. A second PRSP was launched in 2008. 
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world economy are fundamental to understand the way those interests are pursued, and 
the effects they have on the political economy of oil in each place. The international 
institutional arrangements of oil extraction are shared by all oil producing countries and 
explain in part the common patterns stressed by the resource curse approaches.  
In our cases, oil exploitation began in the context of a growing demand. Since the 
First Gulf War (1991), the oil supply strategy of the USA has been to diminish its oil 
dependence vis-à-vis the Middle East, by getting oil from other locations, such as the 
Gulf of Guinea (Obi, 2009). On the other hand, the thirst for energy sources and other 
minerals by emerging economies in Asia, led to increasing prices of strategic 
commodities and boosted investments in the extractive sectors from countries such as 
China.  
At the same time, the structural adjustment policies that have been promoted since 
the 1980s included the generalisation of legal provisions that eased the entry of FDI, 
such as economic integration treaties, bilateral free-trade agreements, or the multilateral 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization level (Gibbon, 2002; Wade, 2003). In 
Africa and other developing areas, this led to the concentration of investments in the 
raw materials industries, and the abandonment of active industrialisation strategies. 
During the 1990s, the WB and the IMF devised a reformed version of the ‘minimal 
state’ model brought by the structural adjustment programmes which emphasised 
governance (Harrison, 2004). That ‘good governance matrix’ promoted poverty 
reduction policies and anticorruption legislation in order to legitimate the neoliberal 
programme of deregulation (Carmody, 2009). At the same time, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds were promoted in many natural-resource rich countries with the explicit aim of 
avoiding the resource curse, and supporting active long run economic policies (IMF, 
2011).  
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We have already seen how the WB conditioned its support to the Chadian project to 
changes in the legislation and the establishment of the Fonds pour les Générations 
Futures and a PRSP. In Equatorial Guinea no such intervention of international 
organisations ever happened, though their desire for international acceptance explains 
the adoption of some formal measures. A new hydrocarbons law was approved in 2006, 
along with a Fund for Future Generations, and a National Plan for Economic and 
Social Development the following year, after a second National Economic Conference 
(Government of Equatorial Guinea, 2006). These funds neither avoid the diversion of 
public money to the political elite nor promote structural change or social expenditure, 
but governments and companies wield them in order to legitimate their participation in 
the oil industry.  
As we can see, oil markets are not only defined by the logic of demand and supply, 
but also by institutions, too often concealed in analyses. One of the institutional features 
of oil markets is the central role played by the sovereign state, even in contexts such as 
Chad and Equatorial Guinea where oil operators are foreign TNCs and the regulatory 
capacity of the state is weak. International and national legal sovereignty conventions, 
developed during the decolonisation process, consider the state the legitimate owner of 
the natural resources under the soil and those who occupy the government its legal 
representatives with capacity to carry out negotiations concerning these resources. The 
huge capital investments required in the oil industry make companies eager to deal with 
state officials, who work as true gatekeepers, rather than with any other local group or 
authority (Reno, 2000 and 2001; Cooper, 2002).  
Another feature of the world economy is that the global financial system is organised 
in such a way that allows legal and illegal capital flight (Shaxson, 2011). The existence 
of private financial institutions, some of them based not only in tax havens but also in 
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Western (and increasingly in other countries’) territories, allows rentier governments to 
keep oil revenues away from the national treasuries. The scandal of the Riggs Bank is a 
case in point. Part of the money poured into the Nguema family's accounts by US oil 
companies seems to have been used to buy personal estates in the US and Spain, in this 
case through money transfers to Banco Santander (Open Society, 2009). 
Finally, the rentier behaviour of governments regarding mineral wealth cannot be 
understood without considering the structural inequality among regions that 
characterises the world economy. It is because the Gulf of Guinea’s population lacks the 
consumer capacity of those people in other places, and, to a lesser extent, the 
entrepreneurial and technological capacities to take advantage of the wealth under their 
soil, that other people far away become the main buyers and beneficiaries of it and 
governments can develop the rentier behaviour that lies behind the resource curse. This 
reality may be deepening following the same dynamics that we are analysing here, since 
a rentier economy in cases such as Equatorial Guinea and Chad also blocks poverty 
reduction.   
In any event, neither the governments of Chad and Equatorial Guinea, nor the US 
and other involved oil companies, can claim to be mere victims of these international 
institutions and structures. To a greater or a lesser extent, all of them play a role in the 
construction and maintenance of this unequal system, which politically fragments the 
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Concluding remarks 
A close look at the specific cases of Chad and Equatorial Guinea shows that many 
common features such as authoritarianism, conflict, poverty and underdevelopment are 
shaped by the oil rent. How this rent empowers both governments vis-à-vis their 
impoverished population and fuels conflict is well described by the resource curse 
approaches. Obiang Nguema and Idriss Déby are able to pursuit their political agendas 
thanks to the oil rent, which enables them to crush and co-opt the opposition and hold 
on in power, as well as to enrich themselves and their closer circle. The fiscal 
irrelevance of the local population explains in great part the absence of social policies 
and redistributive mechanisms based on the oil revenues.   
However, these common dynamics are not the result of a universal pattern created by 
oil exploitation at any given time or place. On the contrary, they are only intelligible as 
a consequence of particular historical trajectories and a specific way of insertion in the 
world economy. Both countries share a history of colonialism, decolonisation and 
extraversion that explain why oil rents would play a similar role when oil was 
discovered. On the other hand, differences in the effects of oil, such as the fuelling of 
armed conflict in Chad but not in Equatorial Guinea, cannot be explained without 
reference to the local forms that relations between groups adopted in both places during 
the construction of the colonial and postcolonial state, long before oil discoveries.  
If oil rents reinforce authoritarianism and block development prospects it is also 
because certain features of international markets and institutions ensure that oil 
extraction benefits some particular social groups and harms many others. How oil 
acquires value and how this value circulates worldwide, affecting population above or 
near the oil fields is not a product of the intrinsic features of minerals, but of socially 
constructed economic and political relations. In this article, it has been necessary to 
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broaden our understanding of historical and transnational processes in order to explain 
the shared features apparent in both countries, which cannot be considered mere 
products of oil extraction.  
The resource curse approaches illuminate only a portion of a complex process, which 
is transnational in nature and connects, in very unequal ways, geographically distant 
groups and areas of the world. If there is a curse for many of the people living in the 
extracting areas, there are other people blessed by the black gold: without this blessing 
it would not be possible to understand the construction of the political economy of oil. 
The intermediary groups, in our cases those who occupy the local governments and the 
(mostly US) TNCs, are the major beneficiaries of this unequal exchange among regions. 
Only by paying attention to international institutions such as the sovereignty principle, 
and to some specific features of extractive activities, can we understand that the 
relations between those who live near the resources and the final consumers of oil are 
strongly mediated by a small number of individuals: those who possess the means of 
production necessary to exploit the resource, and those who occupy the government.  
In sum, to explain the authoritarianism and the obstacles to human development and 
structural change in Chad and Equatorial Guinea, we have found it necessary to look at 
those aspects barely taken into account by the resource curse approaches. We have 
explored the socio-political and economic framework shaped by history and the 
international political economy before the arrival of oil rents, and we have found that 
these features in both cases are significant in order to explain the specific outcomes of 
oil exploitation. 
Our conclusion goes beyond our two cases and serves as a consolidated proposition 
for further research to reassess the resource curse hypothesis by taking into account the 
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particular trajectories of every case, and structural issues such as the unequal integration 
of producing areas in the world economy.  




Figure 1: Oil fields and pipelines in Chad and Equatorial Guinea 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 Table 1. Chad and Equatorial Guinea, basic data 
 Chad Equatorial Guinea 
Human Development Index (2011) (a) 0.328 (183rd out of 187) 0.537 (136th out of 187) 
GNI per capita (constant 2005 PPP $) (2011) (a) 1,105 17,608 
Life expectancy at birth (years) (2011) (a) 49.6 51.0 
Share of oil revenue in total revenue (per cent) (b) 63.3 (2010) 92.4 (2009) 
Hydrocarbons production (2010) (1) 122,500 bpd (c) 434,500 boe (b) 
Share of oil sector in GDP (per cent) (b) 21.6 (2009) 53.6 (2010) 
Share of oil exports in total exports (2010) (b) 89.2 98.8 
Note: (1) since Equatorial Guinea produces both gas and oil, we use the unit ‘boe’ (barrels of oil 
equivalent) to measure its total production, instead of ‘bdp’ (barrels per day). 
Sources: (a) UNDP;  (b) own calculations from IMF data; (c) EssoChad, Project Update #29 
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